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The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus: societal resilience and the EU response 
 
Prepared for the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review  
by Elena Korosteleva and Irina Petrova, University of Kent 
The search for a ‘better lens’ is exactly what is needed anywhere where polities… and societies are 
democratically challenged (Sadiki 2015:709).    
Introduction 
The presidential election held on 9 August 2020 and the subsequent popular mobilization 
marked the end of an era in the history of post-Soviet Belarus. Cautious and apolitical for three 
decades, Belarusian society seems to have awakened (Petrova and Korosteleva, 2021), in a 
short space of time observing a profound transformation of state-society relations taking them 
to a qualitatively new level of self-awareness and self-organisation.  
The 2020 presidential election, following fraudulent practices of the past (Ash, 2015; Bedford, 
2017; Potocki, 2011; OSCE, 2020a), aimed to suppress opposition at all stages. Popular 
opposition figures, Viktor Babariko, Sergey Tikhanovskiy, Pavel Severinets and Nikolai 
Statkevich were arrested during canvassing, while Valeriy Tsepkalo was forced to flee the 
country. In their stead three female leaders emerged, led by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya as a 
newly registered candidate to replace her husband (Korosteleva, 2020a). On the election day, 
massive administrative resources were mobilized to provide a high level of support for the 
incumbent president (Ioffe, 2020; Shraibman, 2020). The official results accounted for 80.1% 
(4 661 075 votes) for Alexander Lukashenko and 10.1% percent (588 622 votes) for Svetlana 
Tikhanovskaya (Venkina, 2020). The sheer discrepancy between the official and alternative 
figures registered by digital platforms Golos, Zubr and Chestnye Lyudi1 was so stark that it 
caused massive backlash throughout the country with the hundreds of thousands of 
Belarusians gathering for peaceful protests in Minsk and other major cities.  
The authorities responded with the unprecedented levels of violence which shocked the nation 
(Auseyushkin and Roth, 2020; Walker, 2020). Numerous videos shared on social and 
independent media recorded OMON’s (state security forces) appalling brutality beating up 
thousands of people, including children and elderly (Chernyshova, 2020). Six months on, 
around 45,000 people have been detained, fined and sentenced for up to several years in 
prison; while some key opposition figures are facing trial and death sentence (Viasna, 2021).  
Belarussian society, however, responded with a remarkable feat of tenacity and creativity. 
Next to the regular Sunday protest marches, attracting hundreds of thousand people in Minsk,2 
the pensioner protests on Mondays with Nina Baginskaya as their figurehead, became an 
instructive phenomenon on its own as the elderly were always seen as a safe base of 
Lukashenko’s electorate. Separately, women’s chains of solidarity dressed in white-red-white 
 
1 Golos: https://belarus2020.org/home  
  Zubr: https://zubr.in/elections/about  
  Chestnye lyudi: https://honest-people.by/  
2 For additional information see: https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/27/belarus-protests-how-did-we-
get-here  
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colours of the Belarusian historic flag carrying flowers, aimed to convey a peaceful “stop the 
violence” message. Memorials emerging on the site of protesters’ murder (e.g. A. Taraikovsky, 
R. Bondarenko), spontaneous flash mobs, festivities with music, chants and flags, graffiti art, 
tea-drinking meetups in apartment blocks’ public spaces (dvory) and many other forms of 
solidarity and protest emerged in the first months of the election. While some observers argued 
that these protests would dry out in the space of a few months, they instead transformed into 
less visible, yet still powerful local forms of resistance and self-help, united by a shared feeling 
that ‘we will never be the same’ (BBC, 2020). Previously unseen degrees of solidarity, activism 
and mobilization among the Belarusians, despite the OMON brutality and fears over job losses 
signal the emergence of the new and unprecedented spirit of societal ownership. Observing 
this development, the article asks how to understand these new social dynamics in Belarus. 
Relatedly, given the European Union’s (EU) commitment to democracy support in its 
neighbourhood, we analyse what the implications of these developments for the EU are, and 
what the EU’s response should be.      
These new dynamics have been often referred to in the mainstream literature, as the 
processes of Belarusian nation-building and/or as delayed democratization (Kazharski, 2021; 
Kulakevich, 2020; Moshes and Nizhnikau, 2021). While this categorisation may explain some 
aspects of the occurring change, we argue that there is more to this process. A detailed 
understanding of what is currently unfolding requires ‘a better lens’ (Sadiki, 2015:709) to 
understand the role of communal relations and resilience, in the context of complex life. 
Hence, we believe that applying Complex IR (Kavalski, 2007, 2016), may be more suitable 
here. This approach covers aspects of identity, nation-building and democratization, but also 
allows us to make sense of the key processes of emergence, self-organisation and 
relationality, which are at the heart of the new social dynamics in Belarus. In addition, by 
looking through ‘the local lens’ on the process of change, it helps us avoid the Western-centric 
bias normally associated with the transition paradigm and democracy promotion agenda 
(Kurki and Hobson, 2009). Complex IR explicitly highlights the need for the full decentring of 
external democracy support to the level of the local communities and their self-governing 
initiatives as is demonstrated below. Furthermore, this approach also accommodates 
uncertainty and impossibility to plan and control the developments in a complex world, which 
the above theories struggle to explain.  
We argue elsewhere (Korosteleva and Petrova, 2021) that unlike the mainstream IR or social 
identity and transition theories, Complex IR shifts away from the Newtonian principles of 
linearity and causality, whereby it seems possible to expect that, for example, certain levels of 
economic well-being, education or external investment may inevitably result in some form of 
democratic progress and anticipated institutional settings necessary for the endurance of 
democracy. Instead, Complex IR argues that the world should be seen as an open system, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable, made of entanglements in constant dynamics, which alter 
the very nature of objects depending on their positionality, relations and changes in the 
system. This perspective on the world, also described as a ‘mesh’ (Kurki, 2020; Morton, 2010, 
2013), is characterised by nonlinearity, meaning that an input is not directly or causally-related 
to an output. The famous butterfly effect is perhaps the best illustration of nonlinearity, which 
essentially signifies the principle of unknowability, taking root in natural sciences and 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (1927) in particular. Unpredictability and hence 
uncontrollability are therefore inherent in a complex world, to which current dynamics observed 
in Belarus, fully testify: e.g. despite massive and persistent protests that had united almost 
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every strata of the population, the Lukashenko regime still stands, and yet, at the same time, 
there is a clear sense of its finality which could not be forecast, or controlled, but change is 
clearly underway.  
The mesh/entanglement view of the world emphasises that ongoing processes are essentially 
processual and relational (Bousquet and Curtis, 2011). Relations here are not just 
‘“interactions” of individuals or things...they are not to be thought of as existing against an 
‘empty background’. Instead, relations precede things and relations are “the mesh” from which, 
in which and of which “things” are made’ (Kurki, 2020, p.107). This perspective repositions our 
understanding of relations as being equally intra- and inter-active processes simultaneously 
constituting political actors and the world, inside-out and around us (Kavalski, 2016). Such 
understanding of relationality is directly linked to another principal feature of a complex world 
- emergence. As the term of natural sciences, it means self-organisation when individual 
actions with no central control respond to a changing environment at a macro-level. 
Emergence can be understood as a formation of the whole, where the whole is qualitatively 
more than just a sum of its parts (Kauffman, 1995). In the context of Complex IR, it would also 
imply self-reference and self-reliance which through feedback loops may lead to the 
emergence of a new order, building on a shared vision, inherent strength, capacities and 
resources of a system, thus making it resilient (Korosteleva and Petrova, 2021). These tenets 
of complexity-thinking naturally lead us to the principal conceptual frame of this article - 
societal resilience as a process of self-organisation - which encapsulates and explains the gist 
of the recent developments in Belarus, and helps us understand why the rise of peoplehood 
as a process of emergence in the country may result in irreversible change. 
Peoplehood in Belarus as a process of emergence and resilience  
Resilience entered the EU policy discourse in the 2010s, being defined as ‘the inherent 
strength of an entity - an individual, a household, a community or a larger structure - to better 
resist stress and shock, and the capacity of this entity to bounce back rapidly from the impact’ 
(European Commission, 2012, p.5). The principle is further articulated in various policies and 
EU official documents (European Commission, 2017; European External Action Service, 
2018). iI nevertheless carried the same principal limitations: while ‘the local’ communities 
indeed were seen as critical beneficiaries and ‘keepers’ of resilience, their development was 
conceived as externally rendered, e.g. via EU risk-management and definition of 
‘vulnerabilities’; top-down implemented via ‘nationally embedded programmes’ and ‘capacity-
building’ plans to prepare for adversity; and narrowly conceived as ‘bouncing back’ and simply 
adapting to, rather than transforming with change (Anholt and Sinatti, 2020; Korosteleva, 
2018; Petrova and Delcour, 2020). 
In this article, and elsewhere (Korosteleva and Flockhart, 2020; Petrova and Korosteleva, 
2021), we argue that not only must resilience be ‘home-grown’, inside-out and relational, it is 
also ‘always more’ (Bargués-Pedreny, 2020) - a way of thinking, living and governing - which 
in the context of complex life posited above, should be seen both as a quality of a system (e.g. 
the human community in Belarus impressing the world with its incredible tenacity, creativity, 
stamina and perseverance). Additionally, it is also a process of self-organisation 
demonstrating a system’s ability not just to adapt and survive, but most crucially, to transform 
with, and learn from change, which a prominent democracy scholar Larbi Sadiki refers to as 
‘democratic knowing’ by doing when examining the Arab Spring (2015; 2021). One of the 
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reasons why external templates and top-down preparedness may not work in the face of 
adversity, and why what is emerging as a societal response to change, may be seen as 
irreversible, is because societal resilience works in different ways, via bottom-up and 
horizontal relations. These relations are premised on the intergenerational knowledge system 
imbued in public memory and traditions (which Sadiki described as makhzun in Arabic), and 
socio-cultural imaginary of the future (al-mikhyal) helping people to ‘make sense of the world 
in the quest for self-conception’ (Taylor, 2004, p.23, in Sadiki, 2015, p. 704). This means that 
resilience is all about people, and how they think, intra- and inter-act with their community of 
relations, which, once mobilized, can demonstrate remarkable tenacity and commitment to 
their shared vision of ‘the good life’, that glues and makes them stronger together in the face 
of adversity or crisis. This cross-fertilisation of makhzun and mikhyal, or intergenerational 
knowledge and visions of the future, as Sadiki argues, is ‘closely tied to a society’s biggest 
project of creation of all: “self-creation”’ (Castoriadis, 1994, p.149 in Sadiki, 2015, p. 704). 
Once ‘activated’, it takes societal resilience to a new level, triggering a chain reaction towards 
‘self-creation’, sweeping and irreversible, even if seemingly slow or temporarily impeded by 
authorities, as is presently the case in Belarus. 
Societal resilience, in the context of a complex life, therefore, embodies an emergent, 
relational and very much local, mesh/entanglement of identity ‘as manifested through the 
future [vision]’ (Berenskoetter, 2011, p.652) in the pursuit of the ‘good life’ - e.g. through the 
imaginaries of dignity and freedom; symbols of belonging and suffering; as well as cultural 
poetics against injustice. This is further supplemented by communal support and resource 
infrastructures (from immediate neighbourhoods or supol’nasts in Belarusian, to the social 
movement or hramada in Belarusian), and even, in some cases, involving the rise of 
peoplehood (lyudzmi zvatstsa) as a ‘bottom-up ground swell of activism accompanied by 
openings for potential cultural, political and social transformation. Or, in the absence of 
transformation, a novel revolutionary or rebellious impulse, taking peaceful or violent forms, to 
exert pressure for change bottom-up’ (Sadiki 2015:703). We can see here many parallels with 
the Arab Spring again, which is a still ongoing process of learning democracy, by doing and 
trying. Belarus’ year-long protests embody just that, a commingling of an emergent 
community’s vision for a just and dignified future. Additionally, it is also characterised by 
‘unruliness’ forged in public squares, dvory, universities, factories, hospitals, media platforms 
and even prisons as a shared space for spontaneous civic apprenticeship. This movement 
signals to Lukashenko’s regime of its inevitable demise. Just like in the Arab Spring, it may 
not result in immediate change, but democratic learning has already endued, triggering long 
but inevitable transformation, as a bottom-up relational process of self(-re)organisation: 
‘In the quest for dignity and freedom, unruliness is society’s agential deployment against the ‘occupiers’ of 
the authoritarian state. Central to this unruliness, apart from informally engendering bottom-up notions of 
sovereign identities and participatory citizenship in the public squares of protest, is the people’s coming 
together to ephemerally substitute the authoritarian regimes’ practice.., with their own conceptions of 
political practice, thought and terminology  (Sadiki, 2015, p.715) 
This ‘people’s coming together’ to even ephemerally challenge the status quo is very powerful 
and instructive: it symbolises a rare and palpable moment of becoming with, and is deeply 
political. It is both spontaneous and long-coming, building on a dream of the ‘good life’, free 
and fair, and identity as representation of otherness to the regime reinforced via protest 
symbols (e.g. white-red-white flag in Belarus - see Scollon 2020), music, language (Belsat TV 
Channel in Belarusian with half-a-million subscribers), humour (see e.g. Komissarenko 2021; 
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Luxta Telegram channel), and imageries of art (Norris, 2021) and poetry (PEN/opp 2020), 
fuelled by an acute sense of injustice and pain. It is also more than a society: it turns into a 
transformative political entity, encapsulating the pain of crisis, and the fragility of life - of 
Alexander Taraikovskiy, Roman Bondarenko and many more, martyred for freedom in 
Belarus. It is exactly this ‘al-hirak’ or swell of indignation (Sadiki, 2015) that is currently 
happening a year on, past the August 2020 election in the country, in a variety of forms, 
including student protests; women’s marches; doctors, artists, journalists, workers, 
pensioners’ remonstrations; mass rallies for dignity and solidarity; astounding creativity and 
the mushrooming of neighbourhood enclaves of resistance in response to the brutality, and 
lies of Lukashenko’s regime, that have turned people’s resilience into a transformational force. 
The moment of becoming with, a Belarusian peoplehood has not emerged overnight. It has 
been brewing for years, if not centuries, premised on the past imaginaries of intense suffering 
(especially during World War II), subjugation, abuse and the suppressed identity of the future, 
powerfully expressed by a Belarusian poet Yanka Kupala in ‘We, the People’ [Lyudzmi 
zvatstsa], 1905-7: 
  
And, say, who goes there? And, say, who goes there? 
In such a mighty throng assembled, O declare? 
Belarusians! 
And what is it, then, for which so long they pined, 
Scorned throughout the years, they, the deaf, the blind? 
To be called PEOPLE! 
  
This seemingly sudden mobilization en-masse was not at all unexpected: while long-coming, 
it was a public response to ‘the viciousness with which their vision [for better life] was 
attacked... break[ing] the Belarusian camel’s back’ (Chernysheva, 2020, p.2). With over 
45,000 arrested, and ‘the sickening torture of detainees in custody’ [where] many, including 
minors, were forced to kneel for hours, beaten, deprived of water and food, verbally abused, 
and raped’ that galvanized even those Belarusians who had previously kept away from politics’ 
(Chernysheva, 2020, p.2). The vision of the future, mundanely associated with leading ‘your 
own quiet little life’ (female, 51 years old, Vitebsk), ‘avoiding any change on a daily basis’ 
(Male, 65 years old, Gomel); ‘feeling safe, stable and protected’ (student, 23 years old, Minsk) 
and having ‘a sense of moral satisfaction with life’ (female, 45 years old, Grodno)3 in the 
country previously decimated by war, unquestionably gave way to the powerful ground swell 
of indignation which mobilised everyone, in their fight to be called ‘people’ - ‘lyudzmi zvatstsa’. 
This sense of ‘the good life’ suddenly became crystal clear and unifying no matter what age, 
nationality or profession: to be justly treated as ‘people’, rather than ‘narodets’ (derogatory 
notion of people), ‘bydlo’ (animals), ‘ovtsy’ (sheep), ‘narkomany i prostitutki’ (drug-addicts and 
whores), which Lukashenko’s administration repetitively used towards Belarusians (see e.g., 
Kryzhanovskaya, 2020). The emergence of this acute sense of injustice meant the realisation 
of the single truth which seems to matter to everyone representing a moment of unity - the 
dignity to be human. This single moment, however, meant moving well beyond adaptation and 
 
3 These are some excerpts of the six focus groups conducted in Belarus during May-June 2019 as part of the 
GCRF COMPASS project (ES/P010849/1). They were conducted in all regional centres of Belarus, including Brest, 
Gomel, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk. Each focus group involved up to 11 participants, totalling 54 
respondents representing all the socio-demographic groups (by gender, age and level of education) in equal 
proportions. 
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endurance, to a new transformative force of becoming ‘peoplehood’ (al-hirak), with no turning 
back. 
  
This moment of becoming was also facilitated by communal support infrastructures which 
seemingly emerged from out of nowhere, in a society thought to be fully atomized and devoid 
of community networks. Yet, these support infrastructures resurfaced, being first triggered by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which the state failed to recognise and respond to. These hitherto 
dormant structures range from supol’nasts, talaka (togetherness), to hramada and a sense of 
tuteishyya (‘the people who live here’). When the force of the regime was unleashed on the 
peaceful protesters in August 2020, these communal networks literally metamorphosed into a 
ground swell of self-organisation across the entire country (Astapenia and Marin, 2020; 
Chernyshova, 2020; Douglas, 2020; Shraibman, 2020). These protests were physically 
leaderless, and yet they seemed well-concerted; they were sporadic and dotted, yet powerful 
and undermining of authorities; they were creative and peaceful, yet confronted by rubber 
bullets and stun grenades; and they were fearless, united by people’s shared experience of 
grief and pain which ‘cannot be undone in Belarus’ (Minchenia and Husakouskaya, 2020) 
reaching a moment of ‘actioned resilience’ - becoming a ‘peoplehood’. It was simply 
mesmerising to watch hundreds of thousand-strong crowds every Sunday coming from 
different corners of a city to merge into a unifying hramada; demonstrations of the disabled, 
sportsmen, medics, students, and the elderly; the memorials and festivities organized to raise 
the spirits up - with music, food banks and cheering; unstoppable graffiti art, and thematic 
resistance on a daily basis fuelled by the intoxicating sense of the lost lives of Roman 
Bondarenko and his last words: ‘I am coming out!’.  
 
These essentialized makhzun of the past and the new memories of repression and injustice, 
have now become interwoven with mikhyal, powerful and mobilizing socio-cultural imaginaries 
of what the Belarusians want to be - to be called people - thus turning them into a permanent 
(even when clandestine) feature of the changing political landscape. Imaginaries of Belarusian 
vyshyvanka (traditional clothes), giant hand-made models of a cockroach (aka Lukashenko), 
coffin and death, murals and signs of heart, fist and victory made famous by now imprisoned 
Maria Kolesnikova, fled Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and Veronica Tsepkalo - they all became 
enduring symbols of Belarusian resistance and resilience (Kazharski, 2021; Petrova and 
Korosteleva, 2021). The songs of Victor Tsoi ‘Peremen’ (Changes), Belarusian songs ‘Mury’ 
(Walls) and ‘Three Tortoises’, and even a Russian song ‘They beat us up, but we are flying’ 
by Alla Pugacheva became like an anthem to the Belarusians, every Sunday continuingly 
drawing bigger crowds until regime’s repression hardened eight months into the protests 
(Abdurasulov, 2020).   
  
It is worth noting a particular role of digital means of communication and resistance including 
platforms such as telegram, facebook, twitter, instagram, whatsapp, viber and more. The 
telegram communities Golos, Chestnye Lyudi, Byson, Nexta, Lukhta, etc. - grew from a few 
thousand subscribers to over several millions by the end of August 2020, whose influence for 
a country of 9,5 million is hard to underestimate (VOA, 2020). Furthermore, beside large online 
communities listed above, self-organization was also facilitated by micro-chats arranged by 
many apartment blocks (e.g. Borovaya; Kamennaya Gorka; Serebryanka; Novinki; etc.), 
allowing for the communities of neighbours to form, keep together and coordinate their 
activities (Herasimenka et al., 2020). 
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This new sense of togetherness, accelerated by digital means and solidarity of the Belarusian 
diaspora around the world, as well as an enduring feeling of pain and injustice that have 
snowballed into an enormous burden that only a peoplehood could carry - all of these not only 
made the Belarusians instantaneously more resilient and mobilized. It turned them into a truly 
transformational and transformative force, which will be difficult to contain even with ever-
hardening measures of repression by Lukashenko’s regime.  
 
The EU’s response and how to rethink resilience  
 
How did the EU respond to these inconceivable levels of state brutality and unprecedented 
popular mobilization in this neighbouring state, geographically situated in the heart of Europe? 
The EU’s engagement has been slow and timid, failing to promptly engage with the unfolding 
crisis in Belarus, which by then, saw many lives lost, disappeared, beaten, intimidated and 
abused. Perhaps cautious not to repeat the mistakes of Ukraine’s crisis (2013-14), and eager 
to maintain balance between its support for civil society and official dialogue with Lukashenko, 
being aware of the need to take Russia’s position into account, who pledged its support to 
Lukashenko’s regime, the EU has truly struggled to develop a coordinated response, manifest 
in the delayed actions and indeterminate statements. The Baltic officials, led by Lithuania 
(Rettman, 2020), had to issue their own measures by early September, together with Poland 
(Pempel and Plucinska, 2020), urgently calling on the EU to offer a unified response. The EU 
adoption of sanctions was further delayed by Cyprus using the Belarusian crisis for their 
internal bargaining vis-a-vis the EU to introduce restrictive measures against Turkey. As a 
result, the UK and Canada were the first Western powers to adopt sanctions (including travel 
bans and asset freezes) against eight Belarusian officials in late September 2020, in a 
Magnitsky Act style (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2020). On 2 October, 
the EU agreed to impose a travel ban and an asset freeze on 44 Belarusian officials failing to 
include Lukashenko (European Union, 2020). The latter together with another 14 Belarusian 
officials was added by mid-November, and in December, the EU imposed a third round 
(European Council, 2021) of sanctions targeting economic actors, and prominent 
businessmen and companies which directly benefited Lukashenko’s regime.  
  
The effect of sanctions however has been widely debated, and was openly derogated by the 
Belarusian officials (Lukashenko, 2021). In response, two months into the crisis, the EU 
outlined a ‘four lines of action’ - a semblance of strategy promising, in addition to the list of 
restrictive measures, to support the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in facilitating the national dialogue; to organise a full review of EU-Belarus relations 
by scaling them down; and to continue supporting the Belarusian population (Borrell, 2020). 
Notably, support included a special measure ‘The EU4Belarus: Solidarity with the People of 
Belarus’ (European Commission, 2020a), which put forward a €24 million assistance package 
to support civil society, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), youth and health sectors 
in Belarus. Additional €1 million and €6 million were allocated respectively to support 
independent media and SMEs outside of the ‘EU4Belarus’ measure. Around €2.7 million were 
also targeted to support victims of repression (European Commission, 2020b). This came as 
part of the overall €53 million support announced by the European Commission in August, and 
in addition to the COVID-19 tailor-made measures worth €980 million for the Eastern 
Partnership and €60 for Belarus in particular (Council of the EU, 2020), mobilized earlier to 
tackle the immediate needs of the pandemic crisis, including support for Belarus’ medical staff 
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with PPE, training and equipment; support for vulnerable citizens, the elderly and children; 
and national and local administrations to cope with negative effects of the pandemic and 
provide support for economic recovery.4  
 
All the above measures were also supplemented5 by the Lithuanian prosecutors’ initiative to 
launch the first pre-trial investigation into crimes against humanity by Lukashenko’s regime 
under the universal jurisdiction (European External Action Service, 2020); the US Treasury 
sanctions against nine state-owned entities (US Department of Treasury, 2020) and later a 
Belarus Democracy Act signed by the US President Biden in December 2020 (US Congress, 
2020), as well as the OSCE invocation of the ‘Moscow Mechanism’ (OSCE, 2020b) to trigger 
expert mission to report on the human rights situation in the country, which due to the rejection 
by the Belarusian authorities to participate, was conducted online and published in November 
2020, outlining a pathway towards a possible dialogue for mediation, to resolve the gridlock. 
In the meantime, Russia put its own pressure on the incumbent, forcing him to start drafting a 
new Constitution, and to complete negotiations on the Russia-Belarus Union State Integration 
roadmap, in return for its financial and military support to ensure the country’s stability.  
  
The EU’s protracted engagement with Belarus in the time of crisis has been instructive in many 
different ways. On the one hand, its actions failed to support its own declaration of becoming 
more geopolitical under the von der Leyen Commission, which aimed to revive ‘the EU's role 
as a relevant international actor, and to shape a better global order through reinforcing 
multilateralism’ (Bassot, 2020). Not only has this intention fallen short of real action in Belarus 
to stand up to Russia as another geopolitical player there; it was also further undermined by 
its limited presence in resolving the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Turkey and 
Russia’s influences once more explicitly prevailed. On the other hand, the EU also 
demonstrated its limitations in putting to practice its ‘resilience agenda’ initiated as part of the 
Global Security Strategy (2016) (Tocci, 2020). The resilience strategy aimed to increase 
preparedness for potential challenges by diversifying resources and strengthening local 
ownership, this way trying to enhance societal capacities of developing countries to withstand 
the pressure of autocratic regimes. The traditional instruments offered by the EU to support 
the societal fight against repression to increase resilience were not only rigid in their 
accessibility especially in the time of crisis; they were also inadequate and unable to respond 
to the immediate needs of societal resilience having premeditated thematic priorities, pre-
planned objectives, and benchmarks for assessing the outcomes.6 This shows that the EU’s 
understanding of resilience remains superficial, deeply rooted in positivist epistemology, 
which, as argued above, does not work in a world of nonlinearity and complexity. The analysis 
of the EU’s handling of the Belarusian crisis calls for a profound revision of the EU’s 
conceptualisation of resilience to account for the mesh ontology premised on relations.   
 
 
4 It is worth noting that €30 million of this support given to the national authorities were recalled to be reprofiled by 
the Commission for the civil society, but this was never fully recovered under the new sanction measures - from 
private conversations of the authors with EU officials.     
5 For account of other measures see https://www.robert-
schuman.eu/en/doc/divers/Chronology_of_revolution_in_Belarus.pdf  





Resilience as an analytic of (self-)governance focusing on unlocking local resources and 
communal capacities for transformation in the face of crisis or adversity, has an enormous 
potential for people who wish to build a life they have reason to value. Notably, by enhancing 
local ownership and changing the top-down patterns of governance and outside-in democracy 
promotion tools, this could unlock self-organization and self-reliance, or what we call resilience 
elsewhere (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021). For example, whereas some initiatives, such as 
the complementary support measures ‘in favour of civil society’ (European Commission, 2017) 
aiming to enable local communities to be creative about tackling their respective needs and 
priorities, as part of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) programming 
(Korosteleva, 2020b), are more in line with complexity-thinking and supporting the local 
emergence, the EU still struggles to understand how resilience as self-governance, especially 
in crisis, could work in practice, to give an empowering sense of ownership and freedom to 
communities to fend for themselves. Current programmes carrying a sizeable monetary value 
do not yet form a ‘democratic/learning loop’ (Sadiki, 2015; 2021) required for forging 
democratic knowledge (makhzun) by communities themselves, to fully connect with the socio-
cultural imaginaries of the future (mikhyal), in order to activate people’s resilience proper, in 




The Belarusian crisis of 2020-2021, echoing the Arab Spring and the Revolution of Dignity in 
Ukraine, we argue, is more than just a process of identity- and nation-building, or indeed that 
of transition and democratization. It is a moment of ‘becoming with’ - emergence and self-
organisation of local communities - which, while drawing on their identity and collective sense 
of the good life, local support infrastructures, resources and networks, make them more 
resilient in the face of adversity turning them into peoplehood to transform with change. 
Premised on Complex IR, we argue that rather than seeing this process as a top-down or 
bottom-up, outside-in or inside-out, it is more instructive to think of it as a mesh made of the 
totality of all relations. Resilience as the ability to transform with change, comes from intra- 
and interactions within that mesh, it is therefore local, emergent and relational, which cannot 
be built on external templates or financial injections. Suffering the unprecedented state 
pressure, Belarusian society has risen anew, hardly resembling its feeble self only three 
decades ago: its new quality was forged due to the spirits of ownership and solidarity, being 
connected by pain and indignation, to bring about the moment of peoplehood thus forming a 
new and tangible order of tomorrow.   
 
In order to effectively support this locally-grown and outward dynamic, external actors, and 
the EU in particular, need to rethink their strategies to co-creatively engage in the mesh of 
relations and the ‘environment around’ (Kavalski, 2016). This is where Sadiki’s concept of a 
democratic learning loop gives an important insight into how cooperation could work in 
practice. An important task is sensing (Chandler, 2018) the local dynamic and engaging in 
continuous inter- and intra-actions in order to understand what the local visions, strengths, 
capacities, and needs are to support the initiatives of self-organisation, rather than trying to 
categorise and benchmark them the pre-set objectives and straightjacket them into the known 
evaluation criteria. Such approach envisages genuinely flexible mechanisms of interaction - 
not the EU’s usual understanding of flexibility as giving partners an opportunity to choose from 
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